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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, respectfully
petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to
the Court's decision in the above captioned matter dated February
19, 1993.
BACKGROUND
Alpine school district volunteered to have this case be
one of five "test cases" selected from approximately 35 to 40
cases currently pending before the Tax Commission involving this
issue.

Three cases were appealed and briefs filed with the Utah

Supreme Court.

This case was poured over to the Court of Appeals

which issued its decision on February 19, 1993 reversing the
Order of the Tax Commission.

The other two cases were argued

January 13, 1993 and February 1, 1993 before the Supreme Court
which has them under advisement.

Resolution of the issues

presented in these cases was intended by all parties to impact
not only the named Petitioners but those cases currently pending
before the Tax Commission.
ISSUE ON REHEARING
Did the Court misapprehend the law or overturn findings
of fact which, when viewed under the proper standards of review,
would require the Court to reverse or modify its opinion.

-1-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court applied the "correction of error" standard
when the Commission's application of law to the facts should have
been reviewed for "reasonableness."

The Court misapprehended

important sales tax laws which directly impact its decision.

The

Court overlooked key findings of fact by the Commission and
overturned other findings without requiring Petitioners to
marshall the* evidence in support of the findings and without
holding that the Commission's factual findings were not supported
by substantial evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS "REASONABLENESS."
Although the case cited by this Court, Morton

International Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1992), restates the Pre-A.P.A. Standard of Review, the case which
articulated that standard is Utah Department of Administrative
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, (Utah 1983).
As set forth in that case Mmixed questions of law or fact or the
application of findings of basic fact to the legal rules
governing the case are reviewed for reasonableness."

Id. at 610.

In applying the law to the facts in this case, the Commission, in
its conclusions of law paragraph 14 states:
It is not merely whether the exempt entity engages in
the m€*chanics of a purchase, but rather the legal
status of the exempt entity at the time the purchase is
made, i.e., is it purchasing the property as the final
consumer of the tangible personal property. If the
-2-

exempt entity makes the purchase for itself and its own
use, consumption, or conversion to real property, the
purchase is exempt from sales and use tax. On the
other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for
another person or entity, or for use, consumption, or
conversion to real property by another person or
entity, the purchase is not exempt from sales and use
tax because the exempt entity has only acted in the
capacity of a purchasing agent for the final consumer
which is the contractor.
The Court must determine if this conclusion is
reasonable in light of the statutory setting in which it
operates.

Id. at 611.

In reviewing this finding, the Court

erred in applying a correction of error standard which affords no
deference to the Commission's application of the law to the facts
of the case.

Under the standard set forth in Utah Administrative

Services, the Court should affirm the Commission's application of
law to the facts unless it finds it "unreasonable."

Id. at 658

P.2d 607.
II.

THE COURTS DECISION MISAPPREHENDS THE LAW.
A.

The term sale includes transfer.

In its opinion, the Court's statements indicate a
misapprehension of the relevant law.

It dismisses the

Commission's substantial findings regarding the burdens and
benefits of ownership of the property by stating:
According to the case cited by the Tax Commission, the
benefits and burdens test is used to determine when a
transfer of property takes place for tax purposes.
J.B.N. Tel. Co. Inc. v. Unites States, 638 F.2d 227,
232 (10th Cir. 1981). Sales tax, however, is imposed
on the sale not the transfer of property.

-3-

The statement that the sales tax is imposed on the
"sale" not on the transfer of property, misapprehends basic tax
principles.

"Sale" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-

102(10)(e) means:
any transaction under which the right to possession,
operation, or use of any article of tangible personal
property is granted under a lease or contract and the
transfer of possession would be taxable if an outright
sale were made.
Therefore, the Commission's statement that a salens tax is
"imposed on the sale and not on the transfer of property" is not
an accurate statement of the law and should not be relied on to
support the Court's reasoning in its decision.

The decision also

ignores the possibility of a taxable transfer occurring after the
initial purchase.
B.

The Court misapprehended a critical area of the

law regarding application of the use tax to the transaction.
The statement that the "benefits and burdens" are
looked at only to determine whether there has been a "transfer"
fails to follow through with the

analysis.

Respondent cited

Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 S. Ct. 561 (1978) for a well
recognized principle of taxation; as stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court:
This Court, almost 50 years ago, observed that
"taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements
of title as it is with actual command over the property
taxed - the actual benefit for which the tax is paid."

-4-

(citations omitted).

The Court in Frank Lyon went on to state

that taxation was concerned with substance over form, with "the
objective realities of the transaction rather than the particular
form the parties employed."

Id. at 573.

Understanding of this principle is critical to analysis of
Tax Commission's ruling.

Central to the Commission's ruling was

the finding that Petitioners had the burdens and benefits of
ownership of the property.

The "objective reality" of the

transaction was that the party entitled to a tax exemption,
Apline School District, contracted for, purchased and received
from Petitioner a real property improvement, not tangible
personal property.

The Commission's finding that "to be exempt,

the sale must be from the vendor directly to the governmental
entity, religious institution or charitable organization for the
use of and consumption by the exempt entity" is based on this
principal of looking to the economic realities of the
transaction.

The form of the transaction should not be

manipulated to avoid taxation.

As stated by this Court in

Superior Soft Water v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 201 Utah Adv. Rep.
49 (Nov. 30, 1992) "the form and timing of the financing
arrangement are irrelevant to the rational for exempting the sale
of improvements to sales tax."

Id. at 52.

The Commission's decision is based on the long standing
principal of imposing tax on real property contractors for
materials used in constructing a real property improvement.
-5-

See

Utah Concrete Products Corp, v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah
513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942).

The Commission's decision applies well

established law to the facts as found by the Commission.

Unless

the Court finds the Commission's actions unreasonable, they
should be upheld.
C.

The opinion does not directly address the

Commission's stated basis for imposing the tax.
Finally, the Court misapprehended the legal basis of
the Commission's imposition of the tax.

The Commission's

decision states "Petitioner was the real property contractor for
those materials and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for
the use tax on those materials."

(Decision & Order page 24).

The stated basis of the Commission's holding, use tax
liability, is addressed only in a footnote where the Court
states:
We note that the governing Use Tax Act levies and
imposes an excise tax on "[t]he storage, use, or other
consumption in this state of tangible personal property
purchased for storage, use or other consumption in this
state." Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985)
(Emphasis added). Again, because the use tax is based
on the purchase of tangible personal property and Brown
was not the purchaser, it cannot be liable for a use
tax based on the purchase.
Slip Opinion, p.5 n.2.

The tax is clearly imposed on

the "storage use or consumption of the property purchased for
storage, use or consumption in the state." It is undisputed that
all of the items assessed in the audit were "purchased for
storage, use or consumption in the state."
-6-

Therefore, the items

are subject to tax unless they qualify for a specific exemption.
Under the use tax provision §59-16-3(a), the taxable transaction
is not the purchase but the "storage, use or consumption."
Therefore, the person liable for tax is the person "storing,"
"using," or "consuming" the property.
to the storage, use or consumption,1

Any exemption must apply
The Commission made

specific factual findings to support its holding that Petitioner
was the party "storing," "using" and "consuming" the property:
Storage of any materials or equipment furnished by the
owner was the responsibility of the contractor.
(Finding of Fact 1. Decision & Order . . . page 3).
A preponderance of the evidence indicates that
Petitioner converted the materials from tangible
personal property to real property. (Decision and
Order page 23) .
The person who converts tangible personal property to
real property is the consumer of that tangible personal property
and is liable for the tax.
525 P.2d 408 (1942).

Utah Concrete Products, 101 Utah 513,

The Court's finding that Brown was "not the

purchaser" and "cannot be liable for a use tax based on the
purchase" misapprehends the basis of use tax liability and fails
to address specific factual findings of the Commission.

1

Any of the above trigger liability. The statute is written
in the disjunctive, therefore, it is not necessary to find all
three.
-7-

III.

THE COURT OVERTURNED FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION.
Th€5 standard for overturning factual findings of the

Commission is set forth in Utah Administrative Services as
follows:
The standard of review that affirms Commission findings
on questions of basic fact if they are supported by
"evidence of any substance whatever" and sets them
aside only if they are "without foundation in fact" is
the standard this Court will follow in reviewing the
Commission's finding of basic facts in this case.
658 P.2d at 609,

In order to challenge the

Commission's finding of fact, Petitioner is required to marshall
the evidence in support of the findings and show that they are
without foundation in fact.

Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927

(Utah Ct. App. 1990); West Valley City v. Majestic Investment
Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cornish Town v. Roller,
758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).

At page 2 of the Opinion, the Court

states:
Alpine amended the subcontract through change order
provision deleting those direct-purchase materials from
the subcontract. This, in effect, changed the
subcontract from a furnish and install contract to an
installation only contract with respect to the
materials directly purchased by Alpine.
Although Petitioner makes this unsupported assertion in its brief
(Petitioner's brief page 4), it is directly contrary to the
Commission's findings of fact paragraphs 25 and 28:
25. The change orders which were executed did not
relieve the Petitioner of its duty to furnish
materials, so the contract remained a furnish and
install contract.
-8-

28. Even after the change orders had been made, the
contract still required the Petitioner to be
responsible for "furnishing all the materials and labor
required for the job as described. . . . "
The specific findings of fact by the Commission are in
direct contravention of the unsupported assertion made in
Petitioner's brief which was adopted by the Court.

Petitioner,

in challenging the Commission's findings of fact on this issue,
did not attempt to marshall the evidence in support of the
Commission's finding.
The Commission's finding was based upon detailed contract
provisions set forth in the record below.

As set forth in the

Stipulation of Facts page 5 (R.209), the relevant contract
provisions provide:
These provisions for direct purchase by the Board of
materials and equipment shall not relieve the
Contractor of any of its duties or obligations under
this contract or constitute a waiver of the Board's
right to absolute fulfillment of all the terms hereof.
The contract also provided that Petitioner was responsible for
any risk of loss, damage, theft, vandalism or destruction of any
of the materials after delivery to the site.

(Article 8

paragraph B of the Supplementary Conditions of Instructions to
Bidders Record 208 through 210) The contractor was responsible
for the storage of the materials, all bonds and insurance were to
remain in full force, the contractor was responsible for the
quality of all materials regardless of how they were acquired.
Id. The Commission carefully considered all of the relevant
-9-

contract provisions in the context of the brief and arguments
presented below.
In order for the stated factual basis of the February 19th
Opinion to stand, the Court must overturn specific factual
findings made by the Commission.

In order to attack those

factual findings, Petitioner must marshall all the evidence which
supports those findings and in light of all of the evidence
supporting the findings, the Court must hold that there is no
substantial evidence to support the findings made by the
Commission.

That process was not followed in this case.

As a

result, the factual basis for the Court's ruling is improper.
The statement that the "record can only support a finding that
Alpine not Brown was the purchaser of the commodities" fails to
properly consider the Commission's factual findings.
CONCLUSION
Rather than adhere to the factual findings of the
Commission, the Court has adopted unsupported factual assertions
made in Petitioner's brief as the foundation for its decision.
In order to overturn the Commission's factual findings, all the
evidence supporting the Commission's findings must be marshalled,
then, in light of that evidence, the Court must determine that
the Commission's findings have no foundation in fact.
failed to follow this procedure in this case.

The result is a

faulty factual premise for the Court's decision.
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The Court

Under the Pre-A.P.A. Standard of Review the Court is
required to give some deference to the Commission's application
of law to the facts.

The Commission's application of the law to

the facts found should be reviewed for "reasonableness."
However, the Court has stated that it reviewed the Commission's
decision under a correction of error standard.

The Court has

misapprehended several key principles of the law in analyzing the
Commission's actions.

This misapprehension has resulted in

statements in the opinion which are not accurate statements of
the law.
The opinion does not directly address the basis on
which the Tax Commission imposed liability on Petitioner.

As

written, the opinion can be distinguished as a case where the
Court found the facts to be different than those found by the
Commission, and therefore, based upon its own factual findings,
the Court reached a different conclusion.

The Court's current

opinion does not give any guidance as to whether the result is
based on fundamental disagreement with the Commission's lengthy
legal analysis or fundamental disagreement as to what the
underlying facts were. It is important not only for the litigants
in this case, but for all of the parties who have stayed their
proceedings before the Commission awaiting the outcome of this
decision, that the Court address the fundamental legal
conclusions reached by the Commission.

For all of the reasons

stated above, Petitioner urges the Court to grant rehearing on
-11-

this matter so that the resulting decision and opinion can stand
as a clear and correct statement of law in this area.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,Z-i

day ^j,•-,-,,./, / 1993.

d^

-CLARK L."'SNELSON
Assistant Attorney General

-12-

CERTIFICATION
The undersigned certifies that the Petition for
Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED this j t

day of f]l\, ,. (

1993.
i

IK L. SNELSON
Assistant Attorney General
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1993, I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing
PETITION FOR REHEARING to be hand delivered to the following:
Brinton R. Burbidge
Merrill F. Nelson
Blake T. Ostler
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
BROWN PLUMBING & HEATING CO. ,

)

Petitioner,
V.

)
:
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
:

Appeal No. 87-0435

)

Respondent.

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing

on July

11, 1991.

Paul

F.

Iwasaki,

Presiding Officer and R. H. Hansen, Chairman, heard the matter
for and on behalf of the Commission.

Present and representing

the Petitioner was Blake T. Ostler, Attorney at law, of Kirton,
McConkie and Poelman.

Present and representing the Respondent

was Clark L. Snelson and Brian Tarbet, Assistant Utah Attorneys
General.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.

2.

The period

December 31, 1985.

in question

is January

1, 1984 to

3.
into

a

On June 4, 1985, Alpine School District entered

"General

Contractors

Paulsen/Ellsworth

Construction

general

contractor

for

Agreement"
Company

Alpine

pursuant

was

School

to

required

the

material,

general

tools,

contractor

implements,

to
and

act

District

construction of Cedar Hollow Jr. High School.,
furnish

to

which

as

the

for

the

The agreement
"all

equipment,

labor

and

scaffolding,

permits, fees, etc." to build the school in accordance with the
plans and specifications.
4.

The agreement provided for direct purchases of

construction materials by the school district by adherence to
certain procedures as follows:
a.

The

owner

(Alpine

School

District)

could

purchase certain major items and quantities of materials for
utilization in the project by writing purchase orders directly
to the suppliers.
b.

The

general

contractor

and

its

subcontractors, were required to make a list of materials and
the cost for which such materials could be directly purchased.
c.

The

owner

would

then

provide

purchase

requisitions upon which the contractor would specifically state
its needs and schedules for delivery dates.
d.

The purchase orders were then written by the

owner from the requisitions.
e.

The purchase order amount plus the sales tax

amount was deducted from the total contract amount.

-2-
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f.

Invoices received upon receipt of delivery of

materials to the project site were sent to the owner for direct
payment.
g.

The contractor was required to hold the owner

harmless for any losses, claims, defects, discrepancy, delays
in delivery or other problems relating to the materials except
where

the

failure

was

attributable

to

negligent

acts

or

omissions by the owner.
h.

All

risk

of

loss or damages to materials

resulting from theft, vandalism or any other cause after the
delivery of the materials to the project site was assumed by
the contractor.
i.

The contractor was required to negotiate and

administer all direct purchases by the owner and to furnish to
the

owner

a description,

source

of

supply, trade discount

information and other information necessary to enable the owner
to purchase directly any materials and equipment.
j.

The agreement stated that title to all such

materials and equipment purchased by the owner passed from the
vendor directly to the owner upon delivery to the job site.
k.

After

delivery, the risk of loss, damage,

theft, vandalism, or destruction of or to any materials

and

equipment

the

purchased

directly

by

the

owner

were

responsibility of the contractor.
1.

Storage

of

any

materials

and

equipment

furnished by the owner was the responsibility of the contractor.
-3-

m.

The contractor was required to acknowledge

receipt and approval of any materials or equipment purchased
directly by the owner by signing the invoice for any materials
or equipment.
n.
materials

or

The

owner

was

equipment within

to

make

payment

a reasonable

time

for

any

after

the

receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor.
o.

The owner was not responsible for the loss of

a prompt payment discount from the purchase price if the owner
made payment within ten business days following the receipt of
the signed invoice from the contractor by the owner.
p.

The contract price was reduced by the amount

actually paid by the owner for materials and equipment and by
the sales tax which would have been paid on those materials and
equipment had they been supplied by the contractor.

Similarly,

the amount of any progress payment provided for was adjusted to
reflect the direct purchase of any materials and equipment by
the owner.
q.

The owner was not responsible for the loss of

or reduction in any trade discounts available to the contractor
as a result of any purchases made by the owner.
r.

All bonds and insurance were to remain in

full force. There was no reduction in the amount of coverage or
any deduction for premiums for bonds and insurance.
s.

The provisions for direct purchase by the

owner of materials and equipment did not relieve the contractor
of

any of its duties or obligations under the contract or
-4-

Appeal No. 87-043.
constitute

a

waiver

of

the

owner's

right

to

absolute

fulfillment of all the terms of the agreement.
t.

The contractor was required to provide and

pay for all materials and equipment not furnished by the owner
and to provide and pay for labor, transportation, services,
tools, machinery and all other items and services, necessary
for the proper execution and completion of the work on the
project.
u.
unsatisfactory

If

the

material

contractor

or

put

workmanship,

into the work
the

contractor

any
was

required to remove all such materials from the project.

6.

Petitioner was the plumbing subcontractor after

entering into an agreement with Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction
Company

and

fixtures

on

was

required

to

furnish

the project, subject

to

and

install

provisions

plumbing

for

change

orders.
7.

The owner, reserved the right to award separate

contracts to perform work with its own forces if it so desired.
8.
Construction

The

General

Conditions

also provided

that the

of

the

owner

Contract

could

amend

for
the

contract by change order and also subtract a contract sum from
the total contract if it so desired.
9.

The General Conditions provided for the owner's

right to stop the work in the event of default or defalcations
by the contractor.
10.
to

Bidders

The Supplementary Conditions of the Instructions
contained

a

statement

that

the

title

to

all

*~\f ^ W

WA-fc,

4..W.

,», .

materials purchased directly by the owner on its own purchase
orders, passed from the vendor directly to the Alpine Board of
Education upon delivery to the job site without any vesting in
the contractor.
11.

On February 20, 1986, Paulsen/Ellsworth Company,

as general

contractor, entered into a subcontract

agreement

with Petitioner Brown Plumbing and Heating Company.
12.

Pursuant to the subcontract, the Petitioner was

the prime plumbing contractor on the project.
1.3.

The

contracting

documents

provided

for

change

14.

Change orders were made to the subcontract for

orders.

materials directly purchased by the Petitioner.
15.

Pursuant to contract documents, purchase orders

were issued by the school district.
16.

No

surplus

materials

retained by the Petitioner.

from

the

project

were

All materials purchased by the

owner and installed by the Petitioner became fixtures or a part
of the junior high school building.
17.
Industries,

One warranty was provided to the owner by PVI
Inc., for work

relation to a water heater.

performed by the

Petitioner

in

The Petitioner installed the water

heater as a part of the project, and the warranty covered the
installation and performance of the water heater.
recognized

the

owner

as

the

appropriate

The warranty

claimant

defects which may occur with the water heater.

for

any

There were no

other warranties on materials installed in the project by the
Petitioner.

-6-
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18.

Dr.

construction

Harold

supervisor

Jacklin
and

was

the

school

representative

for

district's

the project.

Dr. Jacklin is and has been an employee of the Alpine
School District since 1973, and has

supervised

and managed

other construction related projects as the school district's
construction supervisor.
19.
bricklayer,
common

Dr.
and

methods

Jacklin

completed

is generally
of

an

familiar

construction

and

apprenticeship
with

all

of

the

as

phases

a

and

interfacing

relationship between architect, contractor, subcontractor

and

the school district.
20.
used

in

Dr. Jacklin is familiar with materials that are

construction

and

with

materials

installed

on

the

in

the

Project.
21.

Dr.

Jacklin

visited

the

project

site

company of the project architect at least weekly during the
construction.
issuance
behalf

of
of

He was ultimately responsible to authorize the
purchase

the

school

orders

for

district.

construction
Mr.

Sherm

materials
Wankier,

on
the

purchasing agent and an employee of the school district, was
directly responsible to fill out purchase orders on behalf of
the school district and to send them to suppliers of materials
for the project.
22.

After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft,

vandalism, or destruction

of

or to any such materials

and

equipment so purchased would lie with the contractor unless the
damage resulted from the owner's negligence.
-7-

23.

The materials on the project were covered by the

owner's insurer, Educators Insurance Company, and State Risk
Management.

The owner provided insurance coverage for owner

purchased materials after purchase and through construction of
the building.
24.
materials

If

the

through

owner

the

decided

above

to

described

directly

purchase

procedure,

invoices

received upon delivery of materials to the project site were
sent to the owner for direct payment to the vendor.
25.

The change orders which were executed

did

not

relieve the Petitioner of its duty to furnish materials, so the
contract remained a furnish and install contract.
26.

The owner

did not actively participate in the

receipt or inspection of the materials, either by or through
Mr. Jacklin or any other representative.
27.
responsible

The
for

Petitioner,
all

claims,

and

not

shortages

the
and

owner,

defects

in

materials, including those materials purported to have
purchased by the owner.

Petitioner

also

was
the
been

warranted that all

materials, including those purported to have been purchased by
the owner, were and would be free of defects for a period of at
least one year after acceptance of the project: by the owner.
28.

Even after the change orders had been made, the

contract still required the Petitioner to be responsible for
"furnishing of all materials and labor required for the job as
described, together with all minor items implied or required to
finish

'the entire

work

.

.

-8-
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The

contract

also

held

Petitioner responsible for the final result, and provided that
"This contractor shall furnish and install all fixtures shown
or specified hereinafter and make all parts complete and leave
the entire system in perfect working order . . . .

Any damaged

or

contractors

cracked

fixtures

shall

be

replaced

at

the

expense."
29.

The risks of ownership of the materials was never

on the owner, but shifted directly from the vendor

to the

Petitioner.
30.
of risk.

The Petitioner, not the owner, bore the burdens

The contract provided, "The contractor shall, in all

cases, hold the owner harmless for any losses, claims, defects,
discrepancy, delays in delivery or other problems relating to
such materials . . . .

all risk of loss or damage to materials

resulting from theft, vandalism or any other cause whatsoever,
shall be assumed by the contractor. . .."
31.

The owner reserved the right to go on the job

site "to protect the Board from defects and deficiencies in the
work" or even to stop or reject the work, but none of those
actions by the owner acted to relieve the Petitioner from full
responsibility for not only the labor and installation, but
also the materials,
32.

When the materials were ordered, the involvement

of the owner was minimal.

When the materials were received and

paid for, the Petitioner was required to "acknowledge receipt
and

approval

of

any

such

materials

or

equipment

directly

purchased by the Board by signing the invoice for any such
material or equipment."

Also, Brown Plumbing & Heating was

responsible

to

inspect

and

notify

the

conformance and quality of materials.

owner

of

receipt,

Thus, payment for the

materials was made only after authorization from Petitioner.
33.

The

Petitioner

bore

the

responsibility

and

expense of problems with the materials purchased, such as when
a boiler had a defective part

and the Petitioner, not

the

owner, called the supplier and had the boiler repaired.
34.

The Petitioner, not the owner, had the burdens

and benefits of ownership, and possessed control and ownership
of the materials and property.
35.

Petitioner

did

not

present

any

evidence

that

there had been any detrimental reliance upon Rule R865-19-42S.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
its

Sales made to the state, its institutions, and

political

taxes,

subdivisions

are

exempt

from

sales

and

use

(Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(2).)
2.

institutions

Sales

made

to

or

by

religious

in the conduct

of

their

regular

or

charitable

religious

or

charitable functions and activities are exempt from sales and
use taxes. (Utah Code Ann.
3.

Sales

of

§59-12-104(8).)

tangible

personal

property

to

real

property contractors and repairmen of real property are subject
to sales and use taxes. (Rule R865-19-58S).
4.

The person who converts personal property

into

real property is the consumer of the personal property since he
or she is the last person to own it as personal property. (Rule
R865-19-58S).

Utah

Concrete

Products

-10-

Corp.

v.

State

Tax

Commission,

802

P.2d

408

(Utah

1942);

Olson

Construction

Company v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112
(Utah

1961);

and

Tummurru

Trades, Inc. v. Utah

State Tax

Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990).
5.

The contractor

or repairman is the consumer of

tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair
real property. (Rule R865-19-58S).
6.

Sales of materials and supplies to contractors

and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final
consumers, even if the contract is performed for a religious
institution,

charitable

organization,

or

governmental

instrumentality. (Rule R865-19-58S).
7.
charitable

Sales

of

materials

organizations,

and

to

religious

governmental

institutions,

instrumentalities

are exempt only if sold as tangible personal property and the
direct or indirect seller does not install the material as an
improvement to realty or use it to repair real property. (Rule
R865-19-58S).
8.

The contractor must accrue and report tax on all

merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to
improve or repair real property. (Rule R865-19-58S).
9.

Rule R865-19-58S

is the primary rule governing

the sale of materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors
and

repairmen

of

real

property,

and

it

sets

forth

the

requirements for the taxation of the sale or acquisition of
tangible personal property which is to be used to improve,
alter or repair real property.
part:

That rule provides in relevant

A. Sale of tangible personal property
to
real
property
contractors
and
repairmen of real property is generally
subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal
property into real property is the
consumer of the personal property since
he is the last one to own it as personal
property.
2. The contractor or repairman is the
consumer of tangible personal property
used to improve, alter or repair real
property; regardless of the type of
contract entered into—whether it is a
lump sum, time and material, or a
cost-plus contract.
3.
The sale of real property is not
subject to the tax nor is the labor
performed
on
real
property.
For
example, the sale of a completed home or
building is not subject to the tax, but
sales of materials and supplies to
contractors
and
subcontractors
are
taxable transactions as sales to final
consumers.
This is true whether the
contract is performed for an individual,
a
religious
institution,
or
a
governmental instrumentality.
4. Sales of materials to religious or
charitable institutions and government
agencies are exempt only if sold as
tangible personal
property
and the
seller does not install the material as
an improvement to realty or use it to
repair real property.
10.
or

other

Sales of materials from a vendor to a contractor

person

improvement,
governmental
organization

or

entity

alteration
entity,
is

not

or

for

use

repair

of

religious
exempt

from

in

the

real

institution
sales

and

construction,

property

for

a

or

charitable

use

tax.

The

incidents of the tax have been imposed on the contractor and
not on the exempt entity.

To be exempt, the sale must be from
-12-
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vendor

directly

to

the

governmental

entity,

religious

institution or charitable organization for the use

of, and

consumption by, the exempt entity.
11.

The fact that the burden of the tax may be passed

by the contractor on to the exempt entity in the form of higher
prices and is thus paid indirectly by the exempt entity does
not

result

R865-19-58S),

in

tax

Utah

exemption
Concrete

for

the

Products

Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d

transaction.

Corp.

v.

State

(Rule
Tax

408 (1942), and Ford J.

Tvaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d
343 (1944), Qlsen Construction Company v. State Tax Commission,
12 U.2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961).
12.

Parties seeking exemptions from the imposition of

that tax bear the burden of proving that they qualify and are
legally entitled to the exemption.

Parson Asphalt Products v.

Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (1980).
13.

In order for the sale to the exempt entity to be

exempt from sales and use tax it must be a bona fide sale to
the exempt entity acting either in the capacity as the final
consumer of tangible personal property

or the entity

converts the tangible personal property to real property.

which
The

sale is such a bona fide sale to an exempt entity only if
either:
a.

The sale of materials or supplies is to the

exempt entity and the exempt entity has its own
employees attach the materials and/or supplies to
the realty, or
-13-

b.

The sale of materials and supplies is to the

exempt entity, and the exempt entity separately
hires a contractor to attach the materials and/or
supplies to the realty on a labor only or install
only contract, or
c.

The sale of materials and supplies is to an

exempt entity which acts as the prime contractor
by converting the tangible personal property to
real property.
14.

The sale of tangible personal property

is not

exempt from sales and use tax if the exempt entity is simply
acting as the purchasing agent for the general contractor.
is

not

merely

whether

the

exempt

entity

engages

in

It
the

mechanics of a purchase, but rarher the legal status of the
exempt entity at the time the purchase is made, i.e., is it
purchasing the property as the final consumer of the tangible
personal property.
itself

If the exempt entity makes the purchase for

and its own use, consumption, or conversion to real

property, the purchase is exempt from sales and use tax.

On

the other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for
another

person

or

entity,

or

for

use,

consumption,

or

conversion to real property by another person or entity, the
purchase

is not exempt from sales and use tax because the

exempt entity has only acted in the capacity of a purchasing
agent for the final consumer which is the contractor.

-14-
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15.

If the exempt entity enters into a furnish and

install contract with a general or subcontractor which requires
the

general

or

subcontractor

to

furnish

and

install

the

materials and supplies, then the exempt entity is not acting as
the prime contractor as to the materials and supplies required
by contract to be provided by the general or subcontractor.
16.

When the general or subcontractor is required by

contract to provide materials and supplies and install them on
real property, then the contractor

is the consumer of that

tangible personal property and is liable for the sales and use
tax, even if an exempt entity goes through the mechanics of a
purchase by issuing a purchase order and a check for payment.
The contract is the controlling document, and determines who is
the final consumer of tangible personal property, and thus the
contract determines upon which party the incidence of taxation
falls.

Actions taken in noncompliance with the contract may be

accepted without

objection by the contractor

entity, but unless the contract

is modified

and the exempt
or

changed

by

change order to show the consent of the contractor and the
exempt entity to the modifications, the actions that are not in
compliance

with

the

incidents of taxation.

contract

do

not

shift

or

change

the

The written terms of the agreement will

govern the taxability of the transaction and not the actions of
the parties.

This is especially so because written documents

can be audited by State Tax Commission auditors, but actions,
based

on

only

after

the

fact

statements,

representations are impossible to audit.
-15-

allegations

or

17.

For the exempt organization to be acting as the

prime contractor, the exempt organization, by and through its
own employees or agents must:
a.

Exercise

direct

supervision

over

the

construction project.
b.

Issue purchase orders to the vendors for all

materials and supplies for which sales tax is not
paid.
c.

Make direct payment to the vendors for all

materials and supplies for which sales tax is not
paid.
d.

Have provisions in any furnish

and install

contracts to permit changes through change orders
to make that portion of the contract a labor only
or install only contract, and those contractual
provisions must be fully implemented and followed
during the construction process.
18.

For the exempt organizations to act as the prime

contractor exercising direct supervision over the construction
project it is not necessary to act as the general contractor
over the entire project.
exercise

sufficient

Instead, the exempt organization must

direct

supervision

over

the

purchased

materials that there is a change in the legal status of which
entity

is responsible

for

those materials.

Therefore,

the

exempt organization may be the prime contractor by exercising
sufficient direct supervision over the purchased materials to
be the prime contractor for a portion of the total contract.
The prime contractor

or direct
-16-

supervision

requirement

may

apply to relationships within the full general contract.
19.
sufficient

To

be

direct

the

prime

supervision,

contractor

the exempt

and

exercise

organization must

assume the "burdens of risk" or the "incidents of risk."

This

requires evidence that the exempt organization has done more
than

just

act

contractor.

as

a

"purchasing

agent"

for

the

general

If a general contractor issues a purchase order on

forms of the exempt entity and then later issues authorization
for payment by check to the exempt entity, there has just been
the creation of a "paper trail" and the direct supervision test
has not been met.
20.
contractor
general

If

the

exempt

into

a furnish

enter

contractor

organization
and

is contractually

install those materials.

When

and

install

a

general

contract,

the

required to provide and

the contractor

provides

and

installs those materials the contractor is the final consumer
of those materials and is required to pay sales or use tax on
those

materials

(Rule

R865-19-58S).

For

the

exempt

organization to purchase those materials and avoid sales or use
tax, the furnish and install contract must contain a provision
permitting change orders so the exempt organization may ' make
such purchases, and the parties must then actually execute such
change

orders

in

advance

of

the

purchases.

The

exempt

organization, by its own employees or agents, must then issue
purchase orders and vouchers or checks for payment, and must
exercise direct supervision over the purchased materials.
evidence

regarding

whether

or
-17-

not

the

exempt

As

organization

exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials, all
of the relevant factors should be reviewed, including:
a.

Who assumed the burdens or incidents of risk?

b.

Who carried the risk of loss in the event of
damage or destruction of the materials?

c.

Who,

if

anyone,

carried

and

insurance on the materials

paid

after

for

delivery

and prior to installation or attachment to
the real property?
d.

Who

physically

inspected

and

counted

the

materials upon receipt?
e.

If there was a shortage in materials upon
receipt,

who

was

required

to

pay

for

additional materials?
f.

If there was an overage in materials upon
receipt, who retained the surplus materials?

g.

If the materials did not meet specifications
or quality standards, who had the right and
authority to reject those materials?

h.

If materials were rejected

for failure to

meet

specifications,

quality

standards

and it had resulted

or

in a shutdown of the

job, who would have been responsible for the
shutdown expenses?
i.

Who

was

responsible

for

warranties on the materials?
-18-

enforcing

any

j.

To whom

did recourse go

if the materials

were faulty or defective?
k.

If materials failed after installation, who
was responsible

for

any

resulting

damages

including personal injuries?
1.

To whom did the title pass for the purchased
materials?

m.

Were

the

bills

submitted

by

the

vendor

directly to the exempt organization?
n.

Did

the vendors

look

only to the

exempt

organization for payment of the bill?
o.

Did

the

general

contractor

subcontractor

have

to

before

were

paid

they

approve
by

or

the

the
the

bills
exempt

organization?
p.

To whom were the materials delivered, i.e.,
to the contractor, the exempt organization
or

one

of

its

employees

or

agents,

or

directly to the job site?
21.
contractor

Under

a

furnish

and

install

contract,

the

is required to furnish the materials and install

those materials onto real property.

Thus, the contractor is

required to convert that tangible personal property into real
property and the tax is imposed on that consumption
tangible personal property by the contractor.

of the

Therefore, to

avoid sales and use tax on materials used for a furnish and
install contract, the contract must be modified through the
execution

and

implementation

of change

orders.

When

those

change orders have been executed and implemented, the modified
contract must make it clear that the materials in question have
been

separately

purchased

and

provided

by

the

exempt

organization and that the contractor's only duty with respect
to those materials is to provide the labor to install those
materials.
22.

For the purchases of materials and supplies to be

exempt from sales and use tax, the exempt entity must make the
purchase and, title to the purchased items must pass to the
exempt

entity

property.

prior

to

the

time

it

is

attached

to

real

The exempt entity must deal with the purchased items

as its own property and treat those items the same as it would
treat items it purchases for its own use and consumption.
DECISION AND ORDER
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of
tangible personal property, but also upon "tangible personal
property

stored, used

59-12-103[l]).

or

consumed

in this

state."

(U.C.A.

In the construction business, when a person

uses lumber, bricks, cement, steel, nails, and other materials
to construct a building or other improvements to real estate,
that person has used those materials and has converted the
materials
personal

into real property.
property

into

That

real property

conversion
is deemed

of
to

tangible
be

the

consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is
the taxable event.
The

Utah Supreme

Court

has

consistently held that

sales and use tax is imposed upon the party that
-20-
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tangible personal property into real property.

Utah Concrete

Products

supra,

Corp.

v.

State

Tax

Commission,

Olson

Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra, and Tummurru
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra.

The party

that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to
real property has used or consumed that property, is the real
property contractor, and is taxed on that property.

If that

conversion to real property is performed by anyone except an
exempt

entity,

the

use

and

consumption

of

materials is subject to sales and use tax.

the

converted

If the conversion

to real property is performed by an exempt entity acting as the
real

property

contractor,

the

use

and

consumption

of

the

converted materials is not subject to sales and use tax.
Therefore,

the

primary

issue

in

this

case

is

to

determine whether the Petitioner or the owner was the real
property

contractor.

If

indicates that Petitioner

a

preponderance

was the party

of

that

the

evidence

converted

the

tangible personal property into real property, then Petitioner
was the real property contractor and is liable for the tax
assessed by the Auditing Division.

However, if a preponderance

of the evidence indicates that the owner was the party that
converted the tangible personal property into real property
then the owner was the real property contractor and was exempt
from the sales and use tax.
To

determine

which

party

was

the

real

property

contractor, it is necessary to review and analyze the full
scope

of

the

contract

and
-21-

the

legal

rights,

duties,

obligations, and relationships of the parties with respect to
the

materials

converted

into

real

property.

The

primary

evidence available to the Commission to make that determination
is the contract and agreement, together with all duly executed
change orders and other written documents.

Oral testimony is

beneficial

and

in

interpreting

the

documents

gaining

some

insight into the conduct of the parties and, to some extent,
their

understanding

However, where

any

of

the

requirements

inconsistencies

may

of

the

exist

contract.

between

the

written contract, including executed change orders, and either
the conduct

or

oral testimony

of

any

person,

the

written

contract must be presumed to govern or prevail.
In this proceeding, a preponderance of the evidence
shows that the legal rights, duties and obligations of the
owner did not rise to the level of the real property contractor
because

the

owner

did

not

assume

the

burdens,

risks,

responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the materials
being converted to real property.

Except for the paper work

involved in the purchase order and the check for payment, the
owner had only minimal involvement in the project, during the
construction

process.

The

general

contractor

and

the

subcontractors had nearly total control of and responsibility
for

the

Petitioner

materials
provided

during

the

lists,

construction

specifications

process.
and

The

costs

of

materials to be purchased, and then received, inspected

and

approved the materials, signed the invoices, carried bonds and
insurance on the materials, negotiated
purchases

of

materials, and was
-22-

fully

and

administered

responsible

for

the
the
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materials and any problems with the materials.

The Petitioner

was also required to hold the owner harmless from any problems
with the materials.

The Petitioner, and not the owner, assumed

nearly all of the burdens, risks and incidents of ownership of
those materials.
The owner did have a construction supervisor who made
weekly visits to the project, but there is no evidence that he
had any authority to be involved
project.

in the management

of that

It appears that his role was primarily to observe the

construction progress and report back to his employer.
is

no

evidence

that

the

construction

supervisor

There

had

any

responsibility to review or even look at the materials which
the

Petitioner

alleges

had

been

purchased

by

district, and there

is no evidence that he was

involved

materials

with

the

that

were

the

school

in any way

converted

to

real

property.
The owner did carry insurance on those materials, but
the contractor was also required to carry insurance on those
materials.

The

contractor

and

subcontractors

(including

Petitioner) had all other burdens, risks, responsibilities, and
incidents of ownership on those materials-

The Petitioner was

contractually required to provide the materials for its portion
of the project.

Petitioner installed those materials onto the

project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming
the risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership
during

the

construction

process.

evidence indicates that Petitioner

A

preponderance

of

the

converted those materials

from tangible personal property into real property.

Therefore,

Petitioner was the real property contractor for those materials
and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on
those materials.
Based upon the foregoing, it is the order of the Utah
State Tax Commission that the Petition for Redetermination is
hereby denied, and the audit assessment made by the Auditing
Division is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

DATED this jfO^ day of , < ^ ^ A
'
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
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^

an sen
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^JQ^ B. Pacheco
Commissioner

S. Blaine Willes
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Brown Plumbing & Heating Co.
c/o Blake T. Ostler
KIRTON, McCONKIE S. POELMAN
1800 Eagle Gate Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Brian Tarbet
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Clark Snelson
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DATED this
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Brinton R. Burbidge, No. 0491
Merrill F. Nelson, No, 3841
Blake T. Ostler, No- 4642
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Brown Plumbing
& Heating Co,
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City UT* 84111-1004
Telephone (801) 328-3600
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BROWN PLUMBING & HEATING CO.,
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF AGENCY ACTION
Petitioner,
vs.

Tax Commission
Appeal No. 87-0435

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Supreme Court
Docket No.

Respondent.

Petitioner, Brown Plumbing & Heating Co., hereby
petitions the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to review the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the
Utah State Tax Commission entered by the Commission in this
matter on March 10, 1992.
DATED this g^*-day of April, 1992.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Brinton R. Burbidg^e
Merrill F. Nelson
Blake T. Ostler
Attorneys for Brown Plumbing & Heating Co-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Petition for Review of Agency Action was mailed, first
class postage prepaid, this f-fo- day of April, 1992, to the
following:
James H. Rogers
Craig Sandberg
Auditing Division
Utah State Tax Commission
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City UT 84134
Brian Tarbet
Clark Snelson
Assistant Attorneys General
3 6 South State Street, 11th Fir
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
OPINION

Brown Plumbing & Heating Co.,

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

(For Publication)
Petitioner,
Case No. 920402-CA

v.
State Tax Commission,

F I L E D

(February 19, 1993)

Respondent.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Brinton R. Burbidge, Merrill F. Nelson, and Blake T.
Ostler, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
Jan Graham and Clark Snelson, Salt Lake City,
for Respondent

Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Russon.
JACKSON, Judge:
Brown Plumbing and Heating Company (Brown) seeks a
redetermination of the sales or use tax deficiency assessed
against it by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission. We reverse.
FACTS
In June 1985, the Board of Education of Alpine School
District (Alpine) entered into a general contractor's agreement
with Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction Company for the construction
of Cedar Hollow Junior High School. Paragraph twenty of the
contract's supplementary conditions provided that Alpine, "at its
sole option and discretion, may purchase certain major items and
quantities of materials from the specifications for utilization
in the project by writing Purchase Orders directly to suppliers."
It is undisputed that Alpine is a political subdivision, and as
such, is exempt from sales tax payments.1 In the event of a

See Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-6(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1985)

direct purchase by Alpine, the purchase order amounts plus the
sales tax that the contractor would have had to pay would be
deducted from the contract price. The contract also provided
that Alpine could amend the contract through a change order
provision.
In February 1986, the Paulsen/Ellsworth Company entered into
a subcontract agreement with Brown to furnish and install the
school's plumbing fixtures. The subcontract contained the same
direct-purchase and change order provisions as the general
contract. Brown knew before entering into the subcontract that
Alpine intended to exercise its option to purchase certain
materials directly from the suppliers. Alpine, in fact, did
exercise its direct-purchase option. Alpine amended the
subcontract through the change order provision deleting those
direct-purchase materials from the subcontract. This, in effect,
changed the subcontract from a furnish and install contract to an
installation only contract with respect to the materials directly
purchased by Alpine. Alpine's official disbursing agent issued
the purchase orders for the materials, and title to materials
vested directly in Alpine.
As to the purchase of the plumbing materials, the parties
stipulated to certain facts and the Tax Commission made specific
findings of fact, which include the following:
Petitioner was the plumbing subcontractor
after entering into an agreement with
Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction Company and
was required to furnish and install plumbing
fixtures on the project, subject to
provisions for change orders.
The General Conditions of the Contract for
Construction also provided that the owner
could amend the contract by change order and
also subtract a contract sum from the total
contract if it so desired.
The agreement provided for direct purchases
of construction materials by the school
district by adherence to certain procedures
as follows:
a.
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The owner (Alpine School District) could
purchase certain major items and
quantities of materials for utilization
in the project by writing purchase
orders directly to the suppliers.
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b.

The general contractor and its
subcontractors, were required to make a
list of materials and the cost for which
such materials could be directly
purchased.

c.

The owner would then provide purchase
requisitions upon which the contractor
would specifically state its needs and
schedules for delivery dates.

d.

The purchase orders were then written by
the owner from the requisitions.

e.

The purchase order amount plus the sales
tax amount was deducted from the total
contract amount.

f.

Invoices received upon receipt of
delivery of materials to the project
site were sent to the owner for direct
payment.

If the owner decided to directly purchase
materials through the above described
procedure, invoices received upon delivery of
materials to the project site were sent to
the owner for direct payment to the vendor.
Pursuant to contract documents, purchase
orders were issued by the school district.
The Supplementary Conditions of the
Instructions to Bidders contained a statement
that the title to all materials purchased
directly by the owner on its own purchase
orders, passed from the vendor directly to
the Alpine Board of Education upon delivery
to the job site without any vesting in the
contractor.
No surplus materials from the project were
retained by the Petitioner. All materials
purchased by the owner and installed by the
Petitioner became fixtures or a part of the
junior high school building.
The owner provided insurance coverage for
owner purchased materials after purchase and
through construction for the building.

The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission audited Brown
for the period of January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1985. Brown
was assessed with tax and interest for the materials directly
purchased by Alpine.
ISSUE
The issue for us to decide is whether Brown can be held
liable for sales tax on plumbing materials and supplies purchased
by Alpine and installed by Brown. In its written determination,
the Tax Commission characterized the primary issue in this case
as "whether the Petitioner or the owner was the real property
contractor." In light of the governing tax statute, the Tax
Commission's characterization is not useful in determining
whether Brown was liable for the sales tax on these commodities.
ANALYSIS
This action was commenced before the effective date of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and we apply a pre-UAPA
standard of review pursuant to Morton Int'l Inc. v Auditing Div.,
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1992). Under Morton, we review for
correctness an agency's application of findings of fact to
statutes th€i agency is empowered to administer if the agency is
in no better position to determine the issue. IdL at 585.
The tax laws in effect during the tax assessment period
govern this dispute. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax
Common, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1992). The Tax
Commission specifically found the tax assessment period was
January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1985. The governing Sales Tax
Act is clear. "Tax" under the Act is "payable by the purchaser
of a commodity or service subject to tax." Utah Code Ann. § 5915-2(8) (Supp. 1985). The tax assessment was on the sale of
plumbing materials, that is, commodities purchased by Alpine.
The Tax Commission makes two alternative arguments to
support a determination that Brown, rather than Alpine, was the
purchaser of these commodities. We find both of these arguments
unpersuasive. The Commission first argues that Brown had the
benefits and burdens of owning the property and is thus the
purchaser. According to the case cited by the Tax Commission,
the "benefits and burdens" test is used to determine when a
transfer of property takes place for tax purposes. J.B.N. Tel.
Co., Inc. v. United States, 638 F.2d 227, 232 (10th Cir. 1981).
Sales tax, however, is imposed on the sale not the transfer of
property. The Tax Commission next argues that Alpine was nothing
more than the purchasing agent for Brown. The subcontract
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specifically states that Alpine had sole discretion to determine
what, if any, materials it would purchase. Because Brown had no
control over Alpine's purchases, no agency relationship existed
between Alpine and Brown as to those purchases. See Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654
(Utah 1988) .
As the stipulated facts and Tax Commission findings
indicate, the record can only support a finding that Alpine, not
Brown was the purchaser of the commodities. Accordingly, the Tax
Commission's application of the findings of fact to the Sales Tax
Act and the resulting conclusion that Brown was liable for tax on
the purchase of plumbing materials by Alpine was incorrect.2
We reverse.

Jackso

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
J
A

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

2. Although the Tax Commission's brief focuses on sales tax
liability, the Tax Commission makes inconsistent reference to
both sales and use tax liability. We note that the governing Use
Tax Act levies and imposes an excise tax on "[t]he storage, use,
or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property
purchased for storage, use, or other consumption in this state.11
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
Again, because use tax is based on the purchase of tangible
personal property and Brown was not the purchaser, it cannot be
liable for a use tax based on the purchase.
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